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Abstract 
This study examines if the prospectus disclosure of the motives for an initial public offering (IPO) explains the long-
run performance of equity issuers. It uses hand-collected data for 245 IPOs from the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET), and also the Market for Alternative Investments (MAI), taken from the 12-year period between 2001 and 2012. 
The stock returns of the IPOs were investigated using cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR). The authors find a significant impact for the level of use-of-proceeds disclosure on IPO underpricing, 
and further that the ex-ante uncertainty and signalling hypotheses explain the IPO underpricing phenomenon in the 
Thai IPO market. Furthermore, Thai firms citing investment needs show significant positive abnormal returns after the 
offering, but issuers that state general corporate purposes and debt payments motives underperform. The authors pro-
vide evidence that the offering size and bull-market conditions significantly affect both the IPO pricing and also the 
strategic disclosure of information in the prospectus. Our results are robust, having been subjected to a wide range of 
sensitivity checks. 
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Introduction  
Security regulators in different countries require 
initial public offering (IPO) issuers, in accordance 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rules, to disclose the intended uses of proceeds 
in the IPO prospectus. Given that the prospectus is the 
primary source of information, and that investors can 
use it to evaluate specifically why firms issue equity 
and their prospects after the offering, it is fundamental 
to understand its usefulness. 
Existing literature presents extensive empirical evi-
dence from international markets to show that Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) outperform in the short run, 
especially on the first day of trading. This effect is 
commonly known as IPO underpricing (Ritter, 1991; 
Lee et al., 1996; Kooli and Suret, 2004; Álvarez and 
González, 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006; Mazouz et al., 
2008; Su and Bangassa, 2011; Thomadakis et al., 
2012; Wen and Cao, 2013; Agathee et al., 2014)1. 
However, previous studies find no evidence that pros-
pectus information on the issue motive can help inves-
tors predict post-issue performance in the developed 
markets (see for example, Dye, 2001; Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2003; Leone et al., 2007; Jenkinson and 
Ljungquist, 2001; Wyatt, 2014; Nielsen et al., 2015).  
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1 IPO underpricing is determined by the percentage difference between 
the offer price and the closing price on the first trading day. In general, 
the underpricing is estimated as the percentage difference between the 
share price at which IPO stocks were sold to investors and the stock 
price at which the shares subsequently traded in the market. 
With regard to IPOs in Thailand, a few empirical 
studies have investigated IPO performance in the 
long-run in the Thai capital market (e.g. Allen et al., 
1999; Chorruk and Worthington, 2010), but they 
have only used the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) index as a benchmark. For the level of in-
tended use-of-proceeds disclosures in the IPO pros-
pectus, to the best of our knowledge, this paper we 
write here is the first time that such investigation has 
been conducted for the Thai stock market. In addi-
tion, we formulate the intended use-of-proceeds 
disclosure index for measuring the level of the dis-
closure and also draw on hand-collected unique data 
on IPO subscription rates by foreigners and institu-
tional investors as our additional proxies, sourcing 
these from electronic documents in the SEC library. 
These data reveal a number of differences compared 
to past empirical literature that focuses on the pres-
ence or absence of forecast disclosure. Importantly, 
our paper provides a more extensive contribution to 
the literature by both using a more up-to-date dataset 
than the data samples used in previous studies on the 
Thai IPO market, and also by analyzing the intended 
use-of-proceeds and IPO performance in two stock 
market segments, namely, SET and MAI. 
Our findings suggest that Thai firms citing invest-
ment needs show significant positive abnormal per-
formance after the offering, but issuers that state 
general corporate purposes and debt payments mo-
tives underperform. We provide evidence that the 
offering size and bull-market conditions significant-
ly affect the IPO pricing and the strategic disclosure 
of information in the prospectus. 
In terms of the value of investigating the Thai case 
and the contribution of our study, the Thai IPO stock 
market is particularly interesting to analyze for a 
number of reasons. First, compared to other coun-
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tries that have established markets, such as the USA, 
the UK, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and others, 
the SET is a relatively new stock exchange. As a 
result, there are not yet many public companies 
listed on the Thai market. One of the ambitions of 
SET, therefore, is to stimulate market activity and 
increase the number of IPOs in Thailand. Second, 
the size of IPOs in Thailand is moderately small, 
and also the SET requirements to list IPOs differ 
from those in other countries. This may cause differ-
ent patterns in the Thai IPOs’ pricing, and conse-
quently lead todifferent price dynamics over time. 
Third, Thailand has recently joined the ASEAN 
exchange. The ASEAN trading link system was 
established in 2012 and is designed to enable inves-
tors to trade stocks from one exchange to another 
more easily. There are now three exchanges that are 
connected to the ASEAN link system: the Bursa 
Malaysia, the Singapore Exchange and the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET). As a result, through 
their local brokers, investors in Malaysia and Singa-
pore can, for instance, conveniently trade in SET 
and MAI stocks, including Thai IPOs. In the future, 
it is expected that Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Vietnam will also gain access to the ASEAN link 
system. Fourth, Thailand is a relatively small and 
thinly traded market but it is quite well integrated 
into the global financial system. Hence, our results 
presented in this study may have broader implica-
tions for many other small and thin emerging mar-
kets similar to Thailand, which are also trying to go 
global by implementing economic, trade and finan-
cial reforms. Our findings may, therefore, be useful 
for investors and regulators in other emerging mar-
kets beyond Thailand. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section 1 is a brief literature review of studies that 
have considered the endogenous disclosure of in-
tended use-of-proceeds. Section 2 provides details of 
the data, methodology, and models. Section 3 pre-
sents the empirical results, and final section con-
cludes the paper, stating the significance of the main 
findings and suggesting avenues for future research. 
1. Literature review and hypotheses  
development 
Our paper is related to the following four strands of 
literature on the performance of IPOs: (i) intended 
use-of-proceeds disclosure and the long-run Perfor-
mance of Initial Equity Issuers; (ii) use-of-proceeds 
purposes and IPO performance; (iii) ex-ante uncer-
tainty, information disclosure and IPO discount; and 
(iv) signalling and Impresario hypotheses for IPOs. 
1.1. Intended use-of-proceeds disclosure and cost 
of capital. One strand of the existing studies has 
focused on the level of use-of-proceeds disclosures 
on the stock market performance of IPOs. For ex-
ample, Loughran and Ritter (1997) examined the 
role of agency problems and information asymmetry 
between management and investors in explaining 
IPOs long-run underperformance. They argue that 
managers influence investors’ expectations about 
future performance through the level and type of 
information disclosed to investors. Similarly, using 
the stated use of the proceeds disclosed on the issu-
ers’ registration statements (S-3 form), Walker and 
Yost (2008) investigated investor reaction to an-
nouncements of 438 equity offerings in the US, and 
found that investors react more favorably to issue 
announcements for firms stating investment reasons 
than for firms that are vague and state general corpo-
rate purposes as the issue motive. This implies that 
the intended use of the issue proceeds allows inves-
tors to assess the quality of the offering, and also 
that the market perceives firms stating general mo-
tives for the issue as being more likely to engage in 
value destroying projects. In another study, Jenkin-
son and Ljungquist (2001) claim that information 
asymmetry and disclosure are used as proxies for 
reducing ex-ante uncertainty, and suggest that new 
issuers disclosing vague information about the use-
of-proceeds results in a higher IPO discount rate. 
Overall, however, the literature contains mixed find-
ings focusing on the roles of information disclosure 
in the use-of-proceeds section in prospectuses (see, 
for example, Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Beatty and 
Welch, 1996; Healey and Palepu, 2001; Schrand and 
Verrecchia, 2002; Schrand and Verrecchia, 2002; 
Leone et al., 2007; Bessler and Bittelmeyer, 2008; 
Chahine and Filatochev, 2008; Nielsen et al., 2015). 
From the above analysis, it can be expected that 
companies that disclose substantial amounts of in-
formation on use-of-proceeds will reduce the cost of 
equity and will be associated with higher transpa-
rency, andtherefore also have a better long-term 
performance. Hence, the first hypothesis can be 
identified as follows.  
H1 The level of intended use-of-IPO proceeds dis-
closure has a positive impact on firms’ long-term 
performance of the stock price.  
1.2 Use-of-proceeds purposes and IPO perform-
ance. According to Wyatt (2014), using proceeds to 
pay loans sends out a negative signal that may increase 
the ex-ante uncertainty of their offerings and the sub-
sequent uncertainty associated with expected future 
cash flows. In this line, Pagano et al. (1998) and Leone 
et al. (2007) showed that firms using their proceeds to 
repaydebt tend to be large and mature companies with 
growth opportunities, or companies that are going 
public to exploit mispricing. Furthermore, firms stating 
their use-of-proceeds to be for debt repayment may 
take advantage of overvalued stocks by timing IPOs 
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during periods of high returns (Autore et al., 2009). As 
a consequence, they are more likely to underperform in 
the long-run. In contrast, companies stating investment 
as the intended use-of-proceeds were able to signal 
their future investment opportunities more clearly (Au-
tore et al., 2009; Hertzel and Li, 2007). Hence, it 
should not be expected they would be underperforming 
in the long-run. However, Jeanneret (2005) examined 
the relationship between the long-term performance of 
French SEOs and their intended use-of-proceeds. This 
study found that firms citing investment needs actually 
do show underperformance in the long-run, but there 
was no abnormal performance for firms whose stated 
purpose was to proceed as recapitalization. In the same 
vein, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) suggested that 
companies intending to use their proceeds for operat-
ing expenses rather than for investment and debt re-
payment were potentially riskier. Elsewhere, Ngatuni 
et al. (2007) argue that prospectus disclosure of the 
intended use of proceeds does not predict variation in 
SEO post-issue performance in the UK. The findings 
of these studies suggest a need to revisit this research 
question using a more recent sample period and alter-
native research design methods. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis is defined as: 
H2 The intended use of IPO proceeds for repaying 
debt (investment) is inversely (positively) related to 
the long-run performance of IPOs. 
1.3. Ex-ante uncertainty, information disclosure 
and IPO under-pricing. In an extension of Rock’s 
(1986)1 model of underpricing, Beatty and Ritter 
(1986), demonstrated that greater ex-ante uncertainty 
regarding a new issue is related to greater information 
asymmetry, which, then, results in higher underpricing. 
They also suggested that issues that are subject to in-
formation asymmetry, such as those from a small 
company, will tend to be underpriced. Consequently, 
such companies then have to face the problem of hav-
ing to retain the shares themselves. Similarly, Rock 
(1986), Ritter (1998) and Ritter and Welch (2002) 
suggested that ex-ante uncertainty about future cash 
flows is related to a lower offer price than would oth-
erwise be expected, and to more severe IPO underpric-
ing. Thus, company characteristics, including age and 
size, are common proxies of IPO underpricing 
(Ljungqvist, 2007). Similarly, Chi and Padgett (2005), 
Cheung et al. (2009), Su and Bangassa (2011) and Lin 
and Tian (2012) found that the offering size or the 
flotation size of an IPO has a negative effect on an 
                                                     
1 ‘The ‘winner’s curse model’ by Rock (1986) and Chen and Sherif (2016) 
assume that informed investors, such as issuing firms and their underwriters, 
have an informational advantage, compared to general and retail investors 
regarding the firms’ present value and the risk of the future cash flows. 
Hence, informed investors invest only in attractively priced IPOs, while 
uninformed investors invest randomly. In order to attract less informed 
investors to preempt the new IPO, shares must on average be underpriced. 
“The uninformed compete with the informed, and the issuer must, ultimately, 
compensate them for their disadvantage” (Rock, 1986, p. 207).  
IPO’s underpricing. In terms of drawing on publicly 
available information, many researchers have used the 
age of a firm at the time of offering as a proxy for 
measuring the ex-ante uncertainty of the IPOs (see for 
example, Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Carter et al., 
1998; Chen et al., 2004; Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; Yu 
and Tse, 2006; Sullivan and Unite, 2009). 
In this paper, we argue that disclosing information 
on the offer size and age of the firm has a negative 
impact on uncertainties and reducing initial returns. 
Hence, the hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
H3 The information on offer size and age of the firm 
is negatively related to level of uncertainty and IPO 
underpricing. 
It has been documented in previous studies that the 
time gap between the offer date and the first day of 
trading may affect the level of ex-ante uncertainty and 
IPO underpricing. For example, those firms that have 
an extended period of time (from the establishment 
date to the IPO offer date) have less information 
asymmetry. This argument has been theoretically de-
veloped by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) and Su and 
Fleisher (1999). Indeed, the time-lag represents a re-
turn for the marketability risk of equity. For example, 
Chen et al. (2004) indicate that a long time-lag increas-
es the risk to IPO subscribers because investors are not 
informed about the share value. Similarly, Yu and Tse 
(2006) and Uddin (2008) demonstrated that an ex-
tended time-lagis associated with IPO underpricing 
and high ex-ante uncertainty. Hence, H4 is stated as: 
H4 The information disclosure on time-lag between the 
IPO date and the first trading date is positively related 
to IPO underpricing. 
1.4. Signalling and impresario hypotheses for IPOs. 
Another strand of literature has placed emphasis on the 
relationship between signalling and the Impresario 
hypotheses, and the information disclosure of initial 
public offering (IPO). For example, Allen and Faulha-
ber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch 
(1989) proposed the IPO ‘signaling’ hypotheses, stat-
ing that through ‘signalling’, good-quality firms are 
able to distinguish themselves from bad-quality ones 
by underpricing their new issues2. Consequently, a vast 
body of literaturehas extended the ‘signalling’ model 
and indicated that government affiliation has an impact 
on IPO underpricing (Chen et al., 20043; Yu and Tse, 
2006; Gao, 2010; Marisetty and Marti, 2010). Notably, 
the ‘signalling’ hypothesis assumes that the underpric-
                                                     
2 A good firm can leave a good impression with investors or use high 
underpricing in order to attract investors who will then subsequently 
subscribe to seasoned equity offerings (SEO). 
3 Chen et al. (2004) indicated that high government ownership is per-
ceived as an increasing agency cost for private stockholders. However, 
there are marketability and liquidity problems when IPOs start trading if 
many shares are held by the state. The same researchers also found that 
government ownership is positively related to the initial return. 
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ing is a deliberate attempt by the issuer to signal its 
quality to the market’ (Chi and Padgett 2005, p. 85). 
According to Welch’s model (1989), a higher-quality 
firm would be more underpriced. In another study, 
Chen et al. (2004) suggested that firms with high prof-
itability and growth rate are of interest to investors. 
This implies that the IPO underpricing should is great-
er when there is higher investor demand. Similarly, 
Cheung et al. (2009) and Su and Bangassa (2011) 
found a positive relationship between a firm’s perfor-
mance and IPOs underpricing. Also, Komenkul et al. 
(2016) examined the signalling effects for the detection 
of speculation of stocks in relation to the degree of 
their prior IPO underpricing. They found a significant 
positive relationship between the magnitudes of the 
IPO underpricing and the probability of an IPO firm 
being classified officially as speculative on the Turno-
ver List (TOL), and government owned IPOs were 
found to be negatively related to the probability of 
appearing on the TOL. Therefore, we favour the argu-
ments for a positive relationship between the shares 
owned by the government and the firm’s performance 
and IPO underpricing: 
H5 The percentage of shares owned by the govern-
ment is positively related to IPO underpricing and 
to the long-run performance. 
Moreover, Ritter (1998) found that only 26% of 
individual investors analyzed fundamental discre-
pancies between the intrinsic value and the offer 
price of IPOs. For edxample, Eng and Aw (2000) 
reported that retail investors do not pay attention to 
the fundamental aspects of IPOs. We can therefore 
conclude that individual and foreign investors are 
uninformed investors. In contrast, Lonkani and Firth 
(2005) and Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) 
have suggested that institutional investors are better 
informed about IPO quality. Similarly, Rock (1986) 
and Beatty and Ritter (1986) demonstrated that in-
formed investors always subscribe to the shares that 
are underpriced, whereas uninformed investors tend to 
receive a larger proportion of the overpriced issues. 
Hence, hypothesis (H6) can be stated as follows: 
H6 The proportion of issues subscribed by foreign-
ers (institutions) is negatively (positively) related to 
the initial return. 
Table 1. Testable Hypotheses to Explain Underpricing and Long-run Performance 
Hypothesis Explanatory variable Variable name IPO underpricing Long-run performance 
Expected sign Expected sign 
1. Use of IPO Proceeds Use-of-proceed disclosure index UDI (-) (+) 
Intended use of IPO proceeds for repaying debt DEBT (+) (-) 
Intended use of IPO proceeds for working capital and investment INV (-) (+) 
2. Ex-ante uncertainty The offer size of IPO firm SIZE (-)  
 The age of IPO firm AGE (-)  
 The time-lag between the firm establish date and the first trading date LAG (+)  
3. Signalling The proportion of IPO shares owned by government  GOV (+) (+) 
 Change in the earnings per share from the IPO issue date to the date 
just prior to the listing date 
EPS (+)  
 Return on asset ROA (+)  
 The proportion of issues subscribed by foreigner PFS (-)  
 The proportion of issues subscribed by institution INS (+)  
4. Impresario Market-Adjusted Initial Return or IPO underpricing MAIR  (-) 
Note: The variables below are employed in the literature and in this study as explanations for the IPO underpricing in Thailand. Sections 3 and 4 of 
this paper provide further detailed definitions of the explanatory variables. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data. Our database consists of all IPOs listed 
on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and Mar-
ket for Alternative Investments (MAI) during the 
period from January 2001 to April 2012. Notably, 
the listing criteria and regulations are more flexible 
in the MAI market compared to the SET market. We 
start our sample from 2001 because the annual vo-
lume of the IPO issues in the earlier years was very 
low, in particular, in the years from 1997 to 1999 
when there were no IPOs issued at all in Thailand.  
The sources of information about the issued IPOs 
are the official prospectus filing forms (Form 69-1) 
available from the IPO filing database provided by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
Thailand1. The information concerning IPO compa-
nies listed on the SET and MAI during the period 
2001 to 2012 was obtained from several other 
sources including SEC, Thailand database, SET 
database and SETSMART. We obtained stock prices 
and stock market indices from DataStream.  
                                                     
1 The listed companies are obliged to publish a prospectus detailing to 
all investors their company profiles, including the history of the firm, 
the organizational structure, the offer size, the proportion of sharehold-
ers, the financial statements covering 5-year periods and the risks in-
volved in their operations etc. We obtained the prospectuses for all the 
IPOs in our sample from the SEC (http://sec.or.th). Additional informa-
tion about the IPOs in our database was obtained from the SET website 
(http://set.or.th). Further data was obtained from the SET SMART 
website (http://www.setsmart.com). 	
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2.2. Use-of-proceeds disclosure index1. The focus 
of this study is on the effect of all types of informa-
tion contained in the narrative use-of-proceeds sec-
tion of the IPO prospectus. However, for the SEC, 
Thailand Database, the IPO prospectus is provided 
in the Thai language version only. Therefore, we 
construct a disclosure index for measuring the levels 
of use-of-proceeds information reported in the 
unique Thai prospectuses. Firstly, we extend that 
disclosure of non-accounting information by classi-
fying the intended use-of-proceeds into six major 
different issues, namely, working capital, general 
operation issues, research and development, service 
improvement, expanding businesses and paying 
down loans. Furthermore, we place importance on 
the magnitude of use-of-proceeds disclosure. We 
also subdivide the information level related to work-
ing capital and loan repayment to 2 levels (high and 
low) and investment to 3 levels (high, moderate and 
low) of disclosures (see more details in Table 2).  
The contents of each use-of-proceeds were com-
pared to the items on the disclosure scoreboard 
and coded as 1 or 0, depending on whether the 
IPO prospectus contained the voluntary disclosure. 
For example, if a company revealed the use-of-
proceeds to be for a specific investment project and 
an amount of money to be for expanding their busi-
ness as well, we gave 3 scores for the level of dis-
closure. The intended use-of-proceeds index was 
quantified as the percentage of recorded information 
items reported on the prospectus. The following 
formula is then used to calculate the index score of 
each IPO company.  
ܷܦܫ௜ ൌ ቀଵ௡ ∑ ܦ௜௡௜ୀଵ ቁ ൈ 100                                  (1) 
where ܦ௜ expresses item i with the value found in 
the IPO prospectus in use-of-proceeds section, oth-
erwise 0. ݊ is the maximum number of a uses-of-
proceed total score in the IPO, which could be 10 
scores. 
Table 2. The percentage of IPO companies disclosing use-of-proceeds information 
Use-of-Proceed items % 
1. Working capital (WC) without details 72.7 
2. Working capital with details (including the amount money and the proportion of IPO proceeds used for WC) 20.4 
3. General operation issues (e.g. sales and marketing supports and factories and equipment) 48.2 
4. Research and development 13.5 
5. Service improvement 10.6 
6. Expanding business without or low details  64.5 
7. Expanding business with moderate details (e.g. use the IPO proceeds for which projects) 47.3 
8. Expanding business with more details (e.g. use the IPO proceeds for which projects with amount money) 15.5 
9. Paying down loans without details 43.7 
10. Paying down loans with more details (including the amount money and the proportion of IPO proceeds allocated for debt repayment) 11.0 
 
Table 3 Panel A summarises the sample by ex-
change and by year of listing. We find approxi-
mately 65% (159 out of 245 total IPOs) of IPO 
listings are on the SET market, whereas only 35% 
are listed on the MAI market. Next, we report the 
number of IPOs by industry category in Panel B, 
and most of the IPOs in our sample pertained to the 
property andconstruction sector (47 firms). For the 
SET market, we show that approximately19% is 
dominated by firms from the service sector, 14% by 
financial sector firms, and 11.95% and 11.32% by 
industrial and technological sector firms respec-
tively. For the MAI, the majority of IPOs are domi-
nated by service and industrial sector firms. 
Table 3. Sample Size1 
Panel A: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by IPO offering year 
Year 
Stock exchange of Thailand 
(SET) 
Market for alternative invest-
ment (MAI) Total 
Number % Number % Number % 
2001 6 3.77 3 3.49 9 3.67 
2002 19 11.95 3 3.49 22 8.98 
2003 21 13.21 6 6.98 27 11.02 
2004 37 23.27 12 13.95 49 20.00 
2005 31 19.50 14 1           6.28 45 18.37 
2006 10 6.29 5 5.81 15 6.12 
2007 6 3.77 6 6.98 12 4.90 
                                                     
1 Details about how the disclosure instrument was developed and scored and the steps that were taken to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
scoring are available from authors upon request.  In particular we provide 3 examples translated from Thai into English of how the disclosure have 
been derived. 
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Table 3 (cont.). Sample Size 
2008 8 5.03 3 3.49 11 4.49 
2009 5 3.14 11 12.79 16 6.53 
2010 4 2.52 7 8.14 11 4.49 
2011 3 1.89 7 8.14 10 4.08 
2012 9 5.66 9 10.46 18 7.35 
Total 159 100.00 86 100.00 245 100.00 
Panel B: sample size disaggregated by exchange and by industry group 
Industry 
Stock exchange of Thailand 
(SET) 
Market for alternative invest-
ment (MAI) Total 
Number      % Number      % Number    % 
      Agro & Food Industry 7 4.40 3 3.49 10 4.08 
      Consumer Products 3 1.89 11 12.79 14 5.71 
      Financial 22 13.84 1 1.16 23 9.39 
      Industrial 19 11.95 25 29.07 44 17.96 
      Property & Construction 46 28.93 10 11.63 56 22.86 
      Resources 14 8.81 2 2.33 16 6.53 
      Services 30 18.87 25 29.07 55 22.45 
      Technology 18 11.32 9 10.46 27 11.02 
Total       159 100.00 86 100.00 245 100.00 
 
In addition, we divide our full sample into two catego-
ries according to the purposes of the use-of-proceeds; 
namely, investment (153 IPOs) and debt repayment 
(92 IPOs). While the firms in the ‘Investment’ sample 
explicitly state that their main motives for issu-
ingequity are to expand their factories or subsidiaries, 
including working capital and general operation issues, 
the main motives for ‘Debt repayment’ use -of- pro-
ceeds are stated to pay loans. Figure 1 plots the com-
position of the use of IPO proceeds for each year.  
 
Fig. 1. Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) with intended use of the proceeds in Thailand between 2001 and 2012  
2.3. Research Methodology. 2.3.1. Measuring the 
Intended Use-of-Proceeds on Under-pricing. In 
order to measure the intended use-of-proceeds and 
factors affecting IPOs issue discounts, a panel linear 
regression model was used to test the ex-ante uncer-
tainty, signalling and impresario hypotheses, as well 
as the factors known to affect under-pricing. The 
model takes the following form: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
21 32
15 22
ln lni i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
j j j j i
j j
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       
      
   
                               (2),
where ܯܣܫܴ௜ is the market-adjusted initial return ܯܣܫܴ௜ or the IPO underpricing calculated by 
ሾሺ ௜ܲ,ଵ െ ௜ܲ,଴ሻ/ ௜ܲ,଴ሿ	– ܴ௜,௠ or percentage change be-
tween offer price and IPO closing price on the first 
trading day; Pi,1 is the closing price on the first day 
of trading; ௜ܲ,଴ is the IPO offering price; and ܴ௜,௠ is 
the stock market index return from the IPO date to 
the first trading date1. ܦܧܤ ௜ܶሺܫܰ ௜ܸሻ is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the IPO reported use-of-
                                                     
1 Ri,m is calculated by (SET1-SET0)/SET0 or (MAI1-MAI0)/MAI0. SET1 
(MAI1) is the closing price of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (Market 
for Alternative Investment) index on the first trading date and SET0 
(MAI0) is the closing price of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (Market 
for Alternative Investment) index on the IPO date. 
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proceeds is for repaying debt (investment), and 0 
otherwise respectively; ܷܦܫ௜ is the use-of-proceeds 
disclosure index. 
The proxies for ex-ante uncertainty are ܵܫܼܧ௜ and ܣܩܧ௜; where ܵܫܼܧ௜  is the number of shares offered 
at the IPO multiplied by the IPO offer price, and 
ܣܩܧ௜ is the age of a firm in years from the estab-
lishment date to the date of the IPO. ܮܣܩ௜ is the 
time-lag between the IPO date and the first trading 
date or; ܩܱ ௜ܸ is the government ownership; ܧܲ ௜ܵ, ܴܱܣ௜, ܴܱܧ௜ and ܦܧ௜ are firm performance meas-
ures; ܲܨ ௜ܵ and ܫܰ ௜ܵ are percentages of foreign and 
institutional investors subscribing for the IPOs re-
spectively. ܦܧܤ ௜ܶ and ܫܰ ௜ܸ are the types of in-
tended use-of-proceeds. Other variables include 
ܤܷܮܮ௜, Industryj and Yearj are control variables for bull market conditions, industry and year effects; 
and i  is the regression error term. 
2.3.2. Measuring the intended use of proceeds on the 
long-run performance of IPOs. The literature con-
tains mixed suggestions on whether to use cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CARi,t) or buy-and-hold ab-
normal return (BHARi,t) to measure the IPO perfor-
mance in the long-run. For example, Barber and 
Lyon (1997), and Lyon et al. (1999) indicated that to 
compare the ܥܣܴݏ against market performance may 
result in misspecification. However, incontrast, Fa-
ma (1998) in particular argues in favour of the use 
of ܥܣܴݏ rather than ܤܪܣܴݏ. Hence, we consider 
both, and our model is identified as follows: 
0 1
2 3
4
( )i i i
k
i i j ij i
j
BHAR CAR DEBT
INV UDI X
 
   

  
                                    (3) 
where ܤܪܣܴ௜ and ܥܣܴ௜ are measures of 3-year post 
abnormal IPOs returns, respectively; UDIi is the use-
of-proceeds disclosure index; ܦܧܤ ௜ܶ	ሺܫܰ ௜ܸሻ is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPOstated use-of-
proceed is for repaying debt (investment) and 0 oth-
erwise. ௜ܺ,௝ is a vector of factors including IPO un-
derpricing known to define the long-run perfor-
mance of IPOs; we also use a range of dummy 
variables to control the market movement and 
industry effects as shown in equation (2).  
The dependent variable in (3) has been calculated as 
follows:  
T T
i,t i,t m,t
t=1 t=1
BHAR = (1+ R ) - (1+ R )                 (4) 
where Ri,t and Rm,t are the monthly returns on stock i 
and the market index in the event month t respectively.
 The market-adjusted abnormal returns of company i 
in event month tሺܣܴi,tሻare calculated for each event 
month t as follows: ܣܴ௜,௧ ൌ 	ܴ௜,௧	–	ܴ௠,௧.	Thus, 
ܴ௜,௧ ൌ 	 ሺ ௜ܲ,௧ െ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵሻ/ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ, where ௜ܲ,௧ is the last 
traded price of the company in event month t and 
௜ܲ,௧ିଵis the last traded price of the company in event 
month t-1. ܴ௠,௧ is the return on the market index (SET 
or MAI indices) in month t and is calculated as 
ܴ௠,௧ ൌ 	 ሺ ௠ܲ,௧ െ ௜ܲ,௠ିଵሻ/ ௠ܲ,௧ିଵ where ௠ܲ,௧ is the 
last closed stock market index in month t and ௠ܲ,௧ିଵis 
the last closed market index in event month t-1. 
The average market-adjusted return for a sample of 
n firms in month t is defined as follows:
 
 
                                         (5) 
The cumulative average abnormal return of compa-
ny i from event month 1 to event month T is defined 
as follows:
 
                              (6)
 
We use the ‘Robust Standard Errors’ in finite samples 
to overcome the heteroscedasticity problem referred to 
as Huber/White estimators. For the robust standard 
errors1, an apparent improvement is possible. For ex-
ample, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) report two 
variance-covariance estimation methods that seem, at 
least in their Monte Carlo simulations, to converge 
more quicklyas sample size n increases, to the correct 
variance/covariance estimates. Thus their methods 
seem valid, although they require more computational 
time problems. Overall, the use of robust S.E. does not 
change the coefficient estimates, but it makes changes 
in the standard errors and provides reasonably accurate 
p-values. 
3. Empirical results and discussion 
3.1. Descriptive statistic. We start our analysis by 
reporting the descriptive statistics. Table 4 (see Ap-
pendix) presents the IPO transactions disaggregated 
by stock market and by the IPO offering year, and 
provides a snapshot of the annual variation in is-
suing firm characteristics between 2001 and 2012. 
We also test the significance of changes over time 
by using the non-parametric test for trends across 
different groupings. As seen from Table 4, the aver-
age SET issuer was approximately 11 to 28 years 
old compared to7 to 28 years for the average MAI 
issuer. The mean offering size nearly tripled over the 
period (328 million Baht in 2001 versus 1,110 mil-
lion Baht in 2012). It can clearly be seen in the MAI 
IPOs that use the IPO proceed for investment (about 
70% of IPOs exceeds the use of debt repayment 
                                                     
1 For more details on Huber/White estimators see White, H. (1980). 
ARi,t  1
n
ARi,t
i1
n
CARi,t  ARi,t
i1
T
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(30%)). The use-of-proceeds disclosure indices are 
on average, 31.57%, 31.38% and 31.92% for the 
entire, SET and MAI samples respectively.   
Furthermore, the IPO underpricing is evident across 
almost all the years in our sample period and across 
both stock markets. We find that the means of IPOs 
underpricing are 25.36%, 20.61% and 34.16% for 
entire, SET and MAI samples respectively. These 
findings indicate that the underpricing is more in-
tense in the MAI compared to SET. The lower pro-
portion of institution and foreign investors subscrib-
ing toIPOs indicate that there are many uninformed 
investors, both retail and individual, in the sub-
market. This indeed requires a higher degree of un-
derpricing in order to attract uninformed investors to 
subscribe for MAI IPOs. We believe that the lower 
underpricing in SET is justified, as the size of firms 
in the SET is larger than those in the MAI. In line 
with previous literature, a higher offer size was re-
lated to lower IPO underpricing as a result of asym-
metric information (Carter et al., 1998; Chen et al., 
2004; Chi and Padgett, 2005; Yu and Tse, 2006; 
Cheung et al., 2009; Sullivan and Unite, 2009; Su 
and Bangassa, 2011). For the Thai IPO market 
trends across different time periods, we found that 
the initial return was, on average, negative or as low 
as -1.01% only in 2006, whereas it is positive for the 
other year-periods, in particular the average IPO 
underpricing turns to be significantly higher in 2011 
and 2012 (73.82%). This is clearly an indication of 
the impact of information disclosure (amount and 
type) on underpricing.  
Table 5 (see Appendix) shows the estimates asso-
ciated with the type of disclosure (investment and 
loan as the intended use-of-proceeds). It is worth 
noting that 152 of Thai IPOs (62.04%) have dis-
closed information in the intended use-of-proceeds 
section for investment including working capital and 
general corporate purposes and 38% have done so 
for the use of debt repayment. Based on the disclo-
sure index (UDI), the IPOs stated use-of-proceeds 
for investment disclose more information (38.71%) 
than debt repayment IPOs (20.35%). For the average 
issue size, we found that the size of IPO firms that 
use disclosure for repaying debt as the use-of-
proceeds is smaller than those associated with in-
vestment use-of-proceeds. The subscription details 
for IPOs for foreign and institutional investors are 
also reported in Tables 4 and 5 for each individual 
market and for the full sample respectively. Howev-
er, based on the average foreigner and institutional 
participation percentage, the dataclearly indicates 
that such investors prefer to preempt the IPOs in the 
SET rather than in the MAI. The average foreigner 
and institutional investors’ subscriptions for SET are 
9.82% and 20.52%, but are only 4.83% and 7.99% 
in the MAI respectively. Notably, there is a signifi-
cant increase in the number of investors that sub-
scribed for new issues between 2005 and 2006. In 
contrast, the proportion of foreign (institutional) 
investors subscribing for IPOs rapidly decreased 
over time, from 9.42% (16.16%) in 2007 to 2.63% 
(4.15%) in 2012.  
In terms of the underpricing and long-run IPOs re-
turns, the first two columns of Table 5 show the 
means and medians of both sub-samples. The find-
ings show that the average market-adjusted initial 
return of IPOs stated use-of-proceeds for investment 
(25.79%) is slightly higher than those for debt re-
payment (24.67%). We also found that 6-month, 1-, 
2- and 3-year BHARs of IPOs that stated using IPO 
proceeds for investment are 5.41%, 16.51%, 14.58% 
and 13.70% respectively, and all are statistically 
significant at 1% higher than those BHARs of IPOs 
that stated using IPO proceeds for repaying debt  
(-10.55%, -11.64%, -36.15% and -45.04% respec-
tively). For CARs the same pattern of results holds. 
It can be clearly seen that the initial return and the 
long-run returns of the ‘Investment’ IPOs are higher 
than those of the ‘Debt repayment’ IPOs. These 
findings are in line with Autoreet al. (2009) who 
reported that issuers stated use-of-proceeds for in-
vestments perform better than those for recapitaliza-
tion in the long-run. For firms’ characteristic, we 
found only insignificant differences between the two 
types of intended use-of-proceeds.  
Overall, we found no convincing evidence or statis-
tical difference between intended use-of-proceeds 
for ‘Investment’ and ‘Debt repayment’ IPOs based 
on the magnitudes of IPO underpricing. However, 
we found evidence supporting the claim that ‘In-
vestment’ IPO firms perform better than ‘Debt re-
payment’ IPO firms in the long-run.  
3.2. Determinants of IPO Underpricing. The re-
sults from Equation (2) for the full sample are pre-
sented in Table 6 (see Appendix). Overall, we find 
that the models (1)-(9) with a representative profile 
of IPO underpricing in the stock market of Thailand 
explain about 38.5% to 50.99% of variations in the 
IPO underpricing1. The Robust standard error is fur-
ther employed both to ensure that all regression 
models do not suffer from the heteroskedasticity 
problem and also to improve the small-sample 
robust estimators for OLS. In order to detect the 
potential influence of multicollinearity in the re-
gression, we used the Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIFs)2, and found that none of the estimates ex-
                                                     
1 We further use a simple regression of initial returns on intended use-
of-proceed dummy variables for ‘Investment’ and ‘Debt repayment’ 
IPOs. The univariate results are not reported on this paper. However, we 
find that there is no statistically significant between use of proceeds 
disclosure and the IPO underpricing. 
2 VIF is calculated as 1/(1 - R2) where R2 is obtained from the regression 
of the variable on all other regressors specified in the model. 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 13, Issue 4, 2016 
168 
ceeded the accepted threshold of 10 (Neter et al., 
1985). Thus, there is no clear evidence of multicollin-
earity in our data.  
We first examined the relationship between the lev-
els of intended use-of-proceeds disclosures and IPO 
pricing. Our findings support H1 and imply that firm 
managers can indeed reduce underpricing (cost of 
equity capital) by disclosing more information. To 
confirm this finding, we constructed the use-of-
proceeds disclosure index (ܷܦܫ) for Thai data and 
inserted it into our model. The results show that the 
UDI has a statistical negative impact on the IPO 
underpricing. This is consistent with the results from 
previous empirical studies (e.g., Schrand and Ver-
recchia, 2002; Healey and Palepu, 2001; Leone et 
al., 2007; Chahine and Filatochev, 2008). Our study 
also considered the types of use-of-proceeds affect-
ing the cost of equity. We therefore examined the 
relationship between ‘Investment’ use-of-proceeds 
and IPO underpricing. Our findings show that INV 
has a negative effect on IPO underpricing. Further-
more, in line with Leone et al. (2007) we found that 
use-of-proceeds disclosure assists investors in 
evaluating IPOs by narrowing their estimate of the 
dispersion of the stock’s secondary value. This im-
plies a reduction in ex-ante uncertainty, and IPOs 
with such disclosures go public at offering prices 
closer to ‘intrinsic’ values and, as a result, are re-
lated to less IPO underpricing onthe first trading day 
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Leone et al., 2007).   
Our findings also support H2 that when issuers dis-
close investment information, operating expenses, 
expanding factories and subsidiaries or working 
capital, there is lower ex-ante uncertainty. In con-
trast, for the use-of-proceeds for debt repayment, 
ܦܧܤܶ, we found that ܦܧܤܶ is positively related to 
underpricing, and is significant. Once issuers intend 
to use the IPO proceeds for recapitalization (repay-
ing their debts), there is greater uncertainty about the 
financial sustainability of their business model. A 
possible justification for the difference between 
‘Investment’ and ‘Debt repayment’ IPOs in terms of 
underpricing is that the Thai IPO companies which 
intend to use the proceeds for investment disclose 
more information on their future operation pro-
posals than the ‘debt repayment’ IPO companies 
as thesemerely provide information on their use of 
proceeds for repaying short-term or long-term 
debts. Consequently, the equity capital is costly 
(leaving more money on the table with discount 
IPO issues at the higher rate) for the latter. 
For firm characteristics, we found that the offer size 
(݈݊ܵܫܼܧ) of IPO firms is negatively related to IPO 
underpricing and is significant at the 1% and 5% 
levels of significance for the entire SET and MAI 
IPOs markets, which support H2,that the coefficient 
on ݈݊ܵܫܼܧ is negative and significant. These find-
ings are in line with Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter 
(1986), Vichakorn and Kennedy (2005), Yu and Tse 
(2006), Chin and Padgett (2005), Guo and Brooks 
(2008), Arthurs et al. (2009), Su and Bangassa 
(2011) and Lin and Tian (2012). Other variables 
(lnAGE and lag LAG) failed to yield reasonablysig-
nificant parameters, which does not support H3. 
These results are in contrast to the findings of Sulli-
van and Unite (1999), Chen et al. (2004), Kirkulak 
and Davis (2005), Yu and Tse (2006), Uddin (2008) 
and Ekkayokkaya and Pengniti (2012), amongst 
others. For the signalling hypothesis measured by 
ܩܱܸ, ܧܲܵ, ܴܱܧ, ܲܨܵ and ܫܰܵ and the degree of 
underpricing, we found an insignificant relationship 
in the Thai market, leading us to reject H4-H5. Nev-
ertheless, the ܴܱܣ variable has a significantly posi-
tive coefficient in models (5) and (6), confirming 
that return on asset has a significant influence on 
underpricing in the SET.  
For market sentiments (bull-market dummy variable 
BULL), as shown in Table 6 (across models (1) 
through (3)), we find a positive relationship with 
the IPO underpricing for the entire SET and MAI 
IPOs. This is in line with the previous literature 
that finds a correlation between IPO underpricing 
and market sentiment and movement (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2002; Su, 2004; Yu and Tse, 2006; 
Kirkulak and Davis, 2005; Ekkayokkaya and 
Pengniti, 2012)1. Furthermore, we found that DE 
has a negative impact on the magnitude of IPO 
underpricing for the entire and the SET IPOs.  
Using bootstrap standard error, the findings in 
Table 6 indicate that the bootstrap simulation pro-
duces a similar pattern of results, where the in-
tended use-of-proceeds for investment (debt re-
payment) has a negative (positive) impact on the 
IPO underpricing, and also insignificant results for 
the majority of other controlling variables. 
3.3. Multivariate analysis of use of the proceeds 
and long-term performance of IPOs. Controlling 
for a fixed set of firm and offer characteristics, Ta-
ble 7 (see Appendix) presents OLS estimates using 
the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) as the dependent variable. We found that 
the disclosure index (ܷܦܫ) is positively related to 
the three-year aftermarket return and is statistically 
significant compared tothe MAI IPOs. Our finding 
is in line with H1 and supports previous accounting 
studies that intellectual capital disclosure in IPO 
prospectuses are significant factors and have a posi-
tive effect on the long-run financial performance of 
firms (see for example,Guo et al., 2004; Bessler and 
                                                     
1 Caglayan and Xu (2016) found that changes in sentiment and its 
volatility affect bank lending negatively. 
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Bittelmeyer, 2008; Neilson et al., 2015). This find-
ing implies that a Thai company that discloses sub-
stantial amounts of information on the intended use-
of-proceeds will be associated with higher transpar-
ency and thus perform better in the long-run. 
In addition, the findings shown support H2, that 
ܦܧܤܶ is negatively related to the BHAR and is sta-
tistically significant. This indicates that those com-
panies whostated their intended use-of-proceeds to 
be for repaying debt experience long-run underper-
formance after going public. These findings are in 
line with Autore et al. (2009), that the issuers stating 
debt repayment (making no mention of investment) 
as their intended use-of-proceeds experienceunder-
performance in the long-run. Hence IPO companies 
benefit from overvalued stocks by timing IPOs for 
periods of high returns to pay debt. As a conse-
quence, they are more likely to underperform in the 
long-run.  
We found that while the ܫܸܰ is positively related to 
the three-year aftermarket return and strongly statis-
tically significant, the intended use-of-proceeds for 
debt repayment is either ambiguous or without any 
clear specification. This implies that the increased 
investment expenditures should be viewed favoura-
bly, as they are associated with higher investment 
opportunities. These findings are in line with Autore 
et al. (2009) that underperformance is stronger when 
debt repayment is the intended purpose.   
In addition, we found that ݈݊ܵܫܼܧ and ݈݊ܣܩܧ are 
not statistically significant for the performance of 
SET IPOs in the long-run. These findings are in line 
with Su and Bangassa (2011), who found no rela-
tionship between offer size and three-year BHAR 
based on an event-time approach. For MAI IPOs, we 
found that the offering size of IPOs had an inverse 
relationship with long-run IPO performance. How-
ever, we argue that whilst IPO underpricing is nega-
tively and significantly related to 3-year BHAR for 
the entire sample and for the SET sample, it is only 
insignificant for MAI. This suggests that during the 
first three years after going public, the larger the 
initial return of IPOs is, the lower is its accumulated 
after-market return. In particular, a 1% increase in 
MAIR leads to a decrease of about 0.54% and 
0.57% for the Thai IPOs in the 3-year after-market 
return. The findings of Ritter (1991, 1998) and 
Bradley et al. (2009). Thus, our findings lead us to 
accept H7, as well as the impresario hypothesis. 
These results are in contrast to the findings of Su 
(2004), who found that the degree of IPO underpric-
ing is positively related to the after-market return for 
250 trading days.  
For models (10)-(15), we found that the information 
of government ownership reported in the prospectus 
is significantly positive, a 1% increase in govern-
ment ownership leads to an increase of approxi-
mately 1.50% and 1% in 3-year buy-and-hold ab-
normal returns for the entire sample and for the SET 
sample respectively. This finding implies that issu-
ers with higher government ownership have, on 
average, a higher performance in the long-run. Thus, 
the government ownership at the IPO time can be a 
signal of long-run performance for SET IPOs. As 
can beseen in Table 7, there is evidence indicating 
that the proportions of Thai IPOs subscribed to by 
foreign (ܲܨܵ) and institutionalinvestors (ܫܰܵ) have 
no effect on the long-run performance of IPOs. For 
CAR, the same patterns of results hold1. 
Conclusions 
This paper examined the impact of endogenous disclo-
sure on the stock market performance of initial public 
offering (IPO) firms. To do this it used hand-collected 
data for 245 IPOs from the main Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) and also from the alternative invest-
ment market (MAI) over the period 2001 and 2012. 
Our initial investigation suggests a significant im-
pact for the level of use-of-proceeds disclosure on 
IPO under-pricing, and further that the ex-ante un-
certainty and signalling hypotheses explain the IPO 
under-pricing phenomenon in the Thai IPO market. 
Further, we demonstrated that the use of IPOs use-of 
-proceeds to disclose information about investment 
has a positive impact on the performance of Thai 
listed companies in both the main and alternative 
stock markets. In contrast, we found a significant 
and inverse relationship with the long-run IPO per-
formance when new issuers intend to use the pro-
ceeds to repay bank loans. In addition, we found that 
the government or state ownership in the IPO filing 
period has a positive impact on the long-run perform-
ance of SET IPOs. Importantly, we demonstrated that 
the size of the issue, the return on equity, and the bull-
market conditions appear to be the significant factors 
that influence the Thai IPO under-pricing.  
These findings have important implications for aca-
demic research into the performance of initial public 
offerings and for practical information disclosure 
alike. The Thai stock market is a relatively small 
and thinly traded market but it is relatively well 
integrated into the global financial system. Hence, 
our findings may have broader implications for 
many other small emerging markets, in particular 
when using the endogenous information disclosure 
of ‘Intended Use-of-Proceeds’ as a signalling factor. 
Our findings could also be of interest to policy-
makers who are continually adopting regulations to 
curb possible conflicts of interest. 
                                                     
1 We provide more robustness analysis by investigating endogeneity 
considerations and identification problems. Results are avaible upon 
request. 
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      Appendix 
Table 4. Summary statistics for Thai IPOs 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2001-2012 Trend Sig. 
Stock Exchange of Thailand                
    Use-of-proceeds disclosure index (%) 15.15 29.18 30.30 29.23 36.36 30.90 21.21 35.22 27.27 34.09 54.54 38.38 31.38 *** 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for invest-
ment  0 13 12 19 20 5 2 6 3 3 2 7 92 * 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for debt 
repayment 6 6 9 18 11 5 4 2 2 1 1 2 67 - 
    Average offering size (million Baht) 489 506 821 2050 854 3,520 1,800 2,910 879 1,510 1,260 1,940 1,630 *** 
    Average firm age (year) 13.40 10.60 14.33 12.49 17.55 12.70 14.17 25.62 27 14.75 21.67 12.88 14.97 ** 
   Average foreigner investor 
subscription (%) 3.50 7.94 7.45 12.52 12.68 16.73 11.55 9.36 3.26 1.06 2.66 4.00 9.82 *** 
   Average institution investor 
subscription (%) 10.80 18.17 
21.7
5 24.53 25.81 27.78 20.98 17.00 8.52 8.16 3.33 7.11 20.52 *** 
    IPO underpricing (%) 43.47 14.34 50.21 12.46 8.24 4.28 27.41 3.88 1.90 27.75 12.94 63.99 20.61 ** 
Market for Alternative Investment                
    Use-of-proceeds disclosure index (%) 21.21 42.42 25.75 34.09 24.02 32.72 28.78 33.33 32.23 41.55 28.57 41.41 31.92 * 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for invest-
ment 0 3 4 8 8 5 4 2 9 5 5 7 60 - 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for debt 
repayment 3 0 2 4 6 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 26 - 
    Average offering size (million Baht) 43.76 72.06 127 107 130 149 128 125 119 98.42 166 463 156 *** 
    Average firm age (year) 7.39 28.11 12.33 11.17 13.28 19.80 13.83 17.33 13.18 20.43 13.57 24.11 15.52 ** 
   Average foreigner investor 
subscription (%) 12.33 1.94 5.19 8.11 10.63 4.06 7.29 0.41 1.27 0.32 0.26 1.26 4.83 *** 
   Average institution investor 
subscription (%) 1.66 0.66 5.48 13.45 19.36 12.36 11.35 15.67 1.64 0.57 0.71 1.19 7.99 *** 
    IPO underpricing (%) 15.76 -0.04 56.66 33.44 2.73 -11.61 33.17 24.70 16.58 49.62 87.59 83.64 34.16 *** 
Entire sample                
    Use-of-proceeds disclosure index (%) 17.17 30.99 29.29 30.42 32.52 31.51 25.00 34.71 30.68 38.84 36.36 39.89 31.57 *** 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for invest-
ment 0 16 16 27 28 10 6 8 12 8 7 14 152 *** 
    Intended use-of-proceeds for debt 
repayment 9 6 11 22 17 5 6 3 4 3 3 4 93 * 
    Average offering size (million Baht) 328 447 667 1,570 629 2,390 963 2,150 357 613 495 1200 1,110 *** 
    Average firm age (year) 11.39 12.98 13.88 12.16 16.22 15.06 14.00 23.36 17.50 18.36 16.00 18.50 15.16 *** 
    Average foreigner investor 
subscription (%) 6.47 7.12 6.94 11.44 12.04 12.51 9.42 6.91 1.89 0.5 0.98 2.63 8.06 *** 
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Table 4. (cont.). Summary statistics for Thai IPOs 
 
    Average institution investor subscription 
(%) 7.74 15.78 18.13 21.81 23.80 22.64 16.16 16.63 3.78 3.33 1.50 4.15 16.12 *** 
    IPO underpricing (%) 34.23 12.37 51.64 17.59 6.52 -1.01 30.29 9.55 11.99 41.67 65.19 73.82 25.36 *** 
Note: this table summarizes the data on 245 initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in Thailand between 2001 and 2012. The data are classified into 2 groups, based on the stock market listing: 
Stock Exchange of Thailand and Market for Alternative Investment groups. The issued size of IPOs is presented in Thai Baht.  The non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups, which is 
an extension of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, is employed.Lack of significance is indicated as ˗. * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. *** Statistical-
ly significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
Variable 
Intended uses of IPO proceeds for 
‘Investment’ 
 Intended uses of IPO proceeds for  
‘Debt repayment’ 
 Different 
Mean Median Std. N  Mean Median Std. N  t-stats z-stats 
UDI 38.71 36.36 0.94 152  20.35 18.18 1.22 93  -11.87*** -9.88*** 
MAIR 25.79 8.88 47.28 152  24.67 9.94 40.42 93  -0.20 -0.14 
6-month BHAR 5.41 -3.26 3.48 140  -10.55 -15.44 38.11 88  -2.98*** -3.23*** 
1-year BHAR 16.51 -4.70 77.06 132  -11.64 -22.34 72.07 86  -2.91*** -3.60*** 
2-year BHAR  14.58 -2.47 100.15 125  -36.15 -41.30 61.48 84  -4.53*** -4.03*** 
3-year BHAR 13.7 -3.60 108.86 117  -45.04 -48.61 73.22 80  -4.52*** -4.06*** 
6-month CAR  5.50 -0.30 38.34 140  -1.46 -14.76 42.00 88  -2.90*** -3.06*** 
1-year CAR  10.64 3.91 57.80 132  -2.66 -18.71 55.29 86  -3.65*** -3.86*** 
2-year CAR 3.18 4.02 74.15 125  -19.18 -38.12 69.88 84  -4.82*** -4.54*** 
3-year CAR 8.97 9.66 89.79 117  -14.48 -38.95 73.31 80  -4.55*** -4.13*** 
AGE  15.13 13.00 11.07 152  15.2 12.00 12.98 93  0.04 -0.01 
SIZE  1,137.85 235.40 3,885.2 152  1,073.9 300.00 3,215.86 93  0.13 1.50 
LAG  12.34 11.00 5.57 152  12.62 11.00 8.29 93  0.28 -0.76 
EPS 55.32 0.03 616.45 152  127.59 0.13 381.11 93  1.02 1.01 
ROA  14.84 0.10 20.01 152  13.65 0.09 26.11 93  -0.37 -0.83 
DE  1.71 1.50 1.36 146  3.49 2.07 5.45 91  3.06*** 3.82*** 
GOV 2.06 0.03 12.18 152  2.03 0.03 11.6 93  -0.02 0.25 
PFS 7.5 0.06 11.46 152  8.99 0.12 14.43 93  0.85 0.44 
INS  15.36 0.00 19.01 152  17.37 0.00 18.14 93  0.82 1.16 
 Note: The sample consists of 245 IPOs made during the entire sample period (2001-2012). The significance of the difference in mean and median between ‘Investment’ IPOs and ‘Debt repayment’ IPOs. See Table 4.
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 Table 6. OLS Estimates-Robust and Bootstrap Standard Errors (MAIR)
Variables Entire IPOs  SET IPOs  MAI IPOs 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS  (4) OLS (5) OLS (6) OLS  (7) OLS (8) OLS (9) OLS 
 β (RSE) [BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE]  β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE]  β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] 
Constant 2.290 (0.580)*** 2.358 (0.539) *** 2.309 (0.531)***  1.771 (0.867)** 1.917 (0.752)** 1.787 (0.730)**  3.518 (2.150)* 3.770 (1.651)** 3.759 (1.670)** 
  [0.592]***  [0.573] ***  [0.546]***   [0.843]**  [0.818]**  [0.788]**   [2.083]*  [2.247]*  [2.413]* 
UDI -0.003 (0.002)**      -0.003 (0.002)      -0.004 (0.005)     
  [0.002]*       [0.002]       [0.005]     
INV   -0.094  
(0.056) 
[0.057]   
   -0.166  
(0.065)** 
[0.073]**      
0.130 
 
(0.140) 
[0.170] 
 
  
DEBT      0.096
 
 
(0.054)* 
[0.056]*      
0.163 
 
(0.062)*** 
[0.066]**      
-0.088 
 
(0.135) 
[0.185] 
lnSIZE -0.120 (0.029)*** -0.126 (0.027)*** -0.126 (0.027)***  -0.087 (0.042)** -0.095 (0.037)** -0.093 (0.037)**  -0.183 (0.112)* -0.198 (0.088)** -0.195 (0.087)** 
  [0.030]***  [0.029] ***  [0.028]***   [0.042]**  [0.041]**  [0.041]**   [0.112]*  [0.115]*  [0.130] 
lnAGE 0.048 (0.037) 0.041 (0.034) 0.041 (0.034)  0.056 (0.046) 0.041 (0.039) 0.039 (0.038)  -0.003 (0.082) -0.022 (0.064) -0.020 (0.064) 
  [0.038]  [0.035]  [0.035]   [0.044]  [0.045]  [0.042]   [0.092]  [0.104]  [0.094] 
LAG -0.002 (0.005) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004)  0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006)  -0.002 (0.012) -0.005 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) 
  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005]   [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.008]   [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
EPS 0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005)  0.004 (0.008) 0.003 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005)  -0.024 (0.050) -0.017 (0.044) -0.021 (0.044) 
  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.007]   [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.007]   [0.059]  [0.052]  [0.058] 
ROA 0.034 (0.186) 0.023 (0.160) 0.028 (0.157)  -0.290 (0.239) -0.295 (0.138)** -0.292 (0.138)*  0.153 (0.383) 0.211 (0.241) 0.190 (0.245) 
  [0.236]  [0.190]  [0.180]   [0.240]  [0.214]  [0.211]   [0.486]  [0.524]  [0.580] 
DE -0.019 (0.008)** -0.018 (0.006)*** -0.018 (0.006)***  -0.020 (0.009)** -0.022 (0.008)*** -0.022 (0.008)***  -0.058 (0.051) -0.033 (0.048) -0.039 (0.048) 
  [0.007]**  [0.009]**  [0.009]**   [0.010]*  [0.010]**  [0.010]**   [0.055]  [0.061]  [0.066] 
PFS 0.144 (0.293) 0.180 (0.275) 0.177 (0.275)  -0.043 (0.405) 0.034 (0.346) 0.026 (0.348)  0.212 (1.526) 0.269 (0.559) 0.266 (0.588) 
  [0.320]  [0.296]  [0.287]   [0.413]  [0.389]  [0.390]   [1.326]  [1.209]  [1.379] 
INS -0.001 (0.192) -0.002 (0.187) 0.004 (0.188)  -0.011 (0.256) -0.026 (0.220) -0.016 (0.223)  -0.272 (0.499) -0.138 (0.421) -0.139 (0.416) 
  [0.206]  [0.194]  [0.184]   [0.248]  [0.235]  [0.238]   [0.538]  [0.555]  [0.632] 
GOV 0.345 (0.262) 0.359 (0.182) 0.360 (0.193)  0.196 (0.300) 0.223 (0.253) 0.204 (0.268)        
  [0.200]*  [0.282]  [0.279]   [0.354]  [0.334]  [0.397]        
BULL 0.127 (0.059)** 0.138 (0.057)** 0.139 (0.057)*  0.068 (0.074) 0.088 (0.063) 0.094 (0.063)  0.198 (0.128) 0.198 (0.114)* 0.198 (0.112)* 
  [0.063]**  [0.058]**  [0.059]**   [0.074]  [0.069]  [0.067]   [0.140]  [0.147]  [0.143] 
Year  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237  153 153 153  84 84 84 
MAX VIF. 6.79 6.56 6.55  6.79 6.56 6.55  6.41 6.56 6.55 
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 Table 6. (cont.). OLS Estimates-Robust and Bootstrap Standard Errors (MAIR)
 
R2 (%) 38.57 38.50 38.59  38.57 41.18 41.16  51.11 50.99 50.59 
F-stats 3.15*** 3.28*** 3.27***  1.75 1.84** 1.80**  1.66* 1.96** 1.91** 
Note: other estimators shown here include Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) improved small-sample robust estimators for OLS, cluster-robust estimators useful when errors may be arbitrarily 
correlated within groups (one application is across time for an individual). Inflation Factor (VIF) is employed to detect the multicollinearity problem and is calculated as 1/(1 - R2) where R2 is 
obtained from the regression of the variable on all other regressors specified in the model. Robust standard errors (RSE) are reported in parentheses, and bootstrap standard errors (BSE) are re-
ported within brackets. 
Table 7. OLS Estimates-Robust and Bootstrap Standard Errors (BHARS) 
Variables Entire IPOs  SET IPOs  MAI IPOs 
(10) OLS (11) OLS (12) OLS  (13) OLS (14) OLS (15) OLS  (16) OLS (17) OLS (18) OLS 
 β (RSE) [BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE]  β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE]  β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] β 
(RSE) 
[BSE] 
Constant 2.079 (1.837) 1.617 (1.769) 2.100 (1.817)  0.969 (2.558) 0.518 (2.565) 1.213 (2.754)  7.456 (5.998) 6.882 (6.401) 7.765 (5.590) 
  [1.726]  [1.616]  [1.719]   [2.447]  [2.217]  [2.551]   [6.877]  [6.145]  [6.791] 
UDI 0.009 (0.005)*      0.018 (0.006)***      -0.003 (0.018)     
  [0.005]*       [0.006]***       [0.019]     
INV   0.470  
(0.149)*** 
[0.142]**   
   0.508  
(0.196)*** 
[0.171]***      
0.595 
 
(0.399)** 
[0.413]   
DEBT      -0.333
 
 
(0.156)** 
[0.142]**      
-0.280 
 
(0.188)* 
[0.167]*      
-0.667 
 
(0.374)* 
[0.454] 
MAIR -0.622 (0.246)** -0.542 (0.250)** -0.568 (0.258)**  -0.701 (0.282)** -0.586 (0.282)** -0.657 (0.302)**  -0.478 (0.505) -0.449 (0.527) -0.411 (0.490) 
  [0.224]***  [0.218]**  [0.221]**   [0.242]***  [0.247]**  [0.264]**   [0.636]  [0.448]  [0.465] 
lnSIZE -0.114 (0.085) -0.086 (0.080) -0.101 (0.082)  -0.047 (0.127) -0.017 (0.123) -0.042 (0.131)  -0.391 (0.316) -0.367 (0.316)** -0.394 (0.286)* 
  [0.083]  [0.077]  [0.082]   [0.123]  [0.114]  [0.126]   [0.370]  [0.343]  [0.381] 
lnAGE 0.043 (0.102) 0.071 (0.096) 0.071 (0.098)  0.052 (0.121) 0.095 (0.122) 0.077 (0.122)  0.198 (0.227) 0.135 (0.251) 0.117 (0.226) 
  [0.094]  [0.095]  [0.092]   [0.113]  [0.121]  [0.122]   [0.289]  [0.263]  [0.277] 
EPS 0.004 (0.010) 0.006 (0.013) 0.005 (0.012)  0.007 (0.017) 0.011 (0.014) 0.010 (0.012)  0.080 (0.123) 0.051 (0.217) 0.048 (0.133) 
  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.015]   [0.018]  [0.015]  [0.013]   [0.171]  [0.182]  [0.198] 
ROA -0.914 (0.865) -0.847 (0.655)** -0.886 (0.717)**  -1.048 (0.961) -0.930 (0.854)** -0.939 (0.933)**  0.394 (2.205) 0.455 (2.788) 0.095 (2.243) 
  [0.719]  [0.683]  [0.721]   [0.873]  [0.869]  [0.901]   [3.012]  [2.504]  [2.703] 
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 Table 7. (cont.). OLS Estimates-Robust and bootstrap Standard Errors (BHARS) 
DE -0.006 (0.030) 0.001 (0.032) -0.005 (0.030)  0.006 (0.029) 0.006 (0.036) -0.002 (0.034)  -0.165 (0.146) -0.067 (0.118) -0.060 (0.109) 
  [0.031]  [0.031]  [0.031]   [0.032]  [0.037]  [0.035]   [0.190]  [0.139]  [0.159] 
PFS -0.141 (0.610) -0.250 (0.512) -0.237 (0.503)  -0.397 (0.780) -0.850 (0.798) -0.733 (0.798)  -0.296 (1.579) -0.153 (1.677) -0.052 (1.459) 
  [0.608]  [0.556]  [0.536]   [0.774]  [0.826]  [0.763]   [2.767]  [2.042]  [2.113] 
INS 0.454 (0.532) 0.489 (0.510) 0.466 (0.520)  0.661 (0.561) 0.744 (0.640) 0.683 (0.641)  0.403 (1.941) 0.450 (1.990) 0.475 (1.735) 
  [0.505]  [0.493]  [0.492]   [0.519]  [0.563]  [0.553]   [1.937]  [1.711]  [1.596] 
GOV 1.473 (0.923)* 1.349 (0.937)* 1.444 (1.032)*  0.937 (0.676)* 0.942 (0.918)* 1.077 (1.006)*        
  [0.889]*  [0.947]  [1.048]   [0.863]  [0.870]  [1.045]        
Year Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 190 190 190  133 133 133  57 57 57 
MAX VIF. 5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 5.81 5.81 
R2 (%) 26.41 29.06 27.14  41.79 41.86 38.73  66.81 71.45 72.88 
F-stats 1.73** 2.86*** 2.68***  2.97*** 4.42*** 6.31***  1.83* 2.86*** 3.07*** 
Note: See Table 6. 
Table 8. OLS estimates-robust and bootstrap standard errors (CARS)
Variables Entire IPOs  SET IPOs  MAI IPOs 
(19) OLS (20) OLS (21) OLS  (22) OLS (23) OLS (24) OLS  (25) OLS (26) OLS (27) OLS 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
 β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
β (RSE) 
[BSE] 
Constant 3.019 (1.577)* 2.682 (1.614) 3.118 (1.469)  0.073 (1.773) -0.314 (1.599) 0.245 (1.639)  8.079 (5.214) 8.399 (5.353)* 9.333 (5.361)* 
  [1.463]**  [1.448]*  [1.453]**   [1.762]  [1.837]  [1.792]   [4.973]  [5.307]  [5.475]* 
UDI 0.014 (0.004)***      0.019 (0.005)***      0.012 (0.016)     
  [0.004]***       [0.005]***       [0.015]     
INV 
  
0.478 
 
(0.116)*** 
[0.111]***   
 
  
0.484 
 
(0.132)*** 
[0.142]***   
 
  
0.692 
 
(0.406)* 
[0.389]**   
DEBT  
    
-0.417 
 
(0.111)*** 
[0.119]*** 
 
    
-0.370 
 
(0.131)*** 
[0.141]*** 
 
    -0.648 
(0.336)* 
[0.374]* 
MAIR -0.372 (0.185)** -0.298 (0.173)* -0.307 (0.164)*  -0.401 (0.206)** -0.296 (0.179)* -0.332 (0.188)*  -0.326 (0.554) -0.377 (0.306) -0.343 (0.389) 
  [0.173]**  [0.157]*  [0.163]*   [0.193]**  [0.188]*  [0.203]*   [0.518]  [0.493]  [0.463] 
lnSIZE -0.135 (0.066) -0.110 (0.067) -0.120 (0.062)  0.018 (0.086) 0.045 (0.079) 0.027 (0.081)  -0.390 (0.244)* -0.394 (0.211)* -0.424 (0.294)* 
  [0.066]  [0.065]*  [0.064]*   [0.089]  [0.093]  [0.091]   [0.276]  [0.288]  [0.292] 
lnAGE -0.033 (0.084) 0.008 (0.080) 0.010 (0.075)  -0.026 (0.105) 0.022 (0.100) 0.015 (0.103)  0.178 (0.224) 0.155 (0.128) 0.148 (0.211) 
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 Table 8. OLS estimates-robust and bootstrap standard errors (CARS) 
  [0.082]  [0.075]  [0.081]   [0.101]  [0.105]  [0.110]   [0.225]  [0.243]  [0.255] 
EPS 0.000 (0.006) 0.002 (0.007) 0.002 (0.006)  0.007 (0.006) 0.01 (0.005)** 0.010 (0.005)**  0.030 (0.127) 0.001 (2.115) 0.004 (0.125) 
  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.011]   [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.009]   [0.144]  [0.157]  [0.145] 
ROA -0.927 (0.498)* -0.833 (0.460)* -0.882 (0.367)*  -1.412 (0.452)*** -1.304 (0.287)*** -1.309 (0.290)***  1.148 (2.896) 1.301 (0.769) 0.937 (1.910) 
  [0.498]*  [0.470]*  [0.513]   [0.485]***  [0.466]***  [0.553]**   [2.701]  [2.659]  [2.519] 
DE -0.017 (0.028) -0.016 (0.029) -0.018 (0.021)  -0.005 (0.029) -0.008 (0.018) -0.012 (0.017)  -0.140 (0.145) -0.093 (1.007) -0.103 (0.102) 
  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.025]   [0.028]  [0.030]  [0.029]   [0.156]  [0.146]  [0.140] 
PFS 0.631 (0.403) 0.437 (0.461) 0.458 (0.432)  -0.296 (0.652) -0.824 (0.663) -0.725 (0.666)  0.253 (2.205) 0.291 (1.768) 0.367 (0.871) 
  [0.430]  [0.483]  [0.510]   [0.683]  [0.702]  [0.714]   [2.069]  [1.965]  [2.498] 
INS 0.063 (0.383) 0.095 (0.391) 0.078 (0.361)  0.446 (0.389) 0.542 (0.388) 0.490 (0.394)  0.275 (1.635) 0.237 (0.353) 0.255 (1.712) 
  [0.386]  [0.366]  [0.386]   [0.388]  [0.415]  [0.436]   [1.553]  [1.448]  [1.293] 
GOV 0.952 (0.468)** 0.892 (0.550)* 0.956 (0.498)*  0.438 (0.335) 0.490 (0.307)* 0.580 (0.327)*        
  [0.558]*  [0.575]  [0.615]   [0.563]  [0.634]  [0.695]        
Year  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 190 190 190  133 133 133  57 57 57 
MAX VIF. 5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 6.05 6.05  5.78 5.81 5.81 
R2 (%) 29.92 31.28 30.05  44.76 42.88 40.19  62.48 67.21 67.01 
F-stats 2.78*** 3.41*** 3.97***  5.26*** 10.65*** 20.24***  2.76*** 1.87* 1.98** 
Note: See Table 6. 
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